To simplify the analysis, we focus on the extreme case where merger leads to monopolization. Zang (1990 and 1993) give monopolization conditions in static and dynamic acquisition games.
In the same way, Zang (1990, 1993 ) considered two acquisition games in which symmetric firms compete "à la Cournot" and a single owner is able to purchase firms. They show on the one hand that, in a static game, monopolization is not possible in industries larger than duopolies. On the other hand, they show in a dynamic game that monopolization is not possible in take into account investment decisions but it cannot be solved analytically. For this reason, we present a model without investment decisions. We find that monopolization conditions are then less restrictive. Indeed, this paper presents static and dynamic acquisition games in which the owner of the most efficient firm attempts to buy the other firms. We find that monopolization is always possible if cost heterogeneity is large enough. This result supports the "takeover waves" explanation of Fauli-Oller (2000) based on cost asymmetries. But Faulli-Oller (2000) considered a four-firm industry in which two firms are more efficient than the two others. Moreover, he underlines the role of negative shocks of demand on the profitability of takeovers. Assuming a low realization of demand, we propose to focus on a main topic: monopolization of a n-firm industry in which a single firm is more efficient than others.
The rest of the paper is organized as follow. In the second section, we present the static acquisition game. The third section is dedicated to the dynamic game. Finally, we conclude on contributions of the cost heterogeneity assumption. 
The static game
We focus on n-firm industries and we define by {1, 2,., ,.., } N i n = the initial set of firms 3 . A firm must be sold in one part. Note that each firm is initially owned by an individual owner but if an owner bought other firms, he adopts a behaviour corresponding to a single entity. Note The inverse demand function for the unique good is given by ( ) 1
We note the linear cost function of each firm ( ) order to determine if the dominant firm is able to make bids to buy out all the competitive fringe firms. As a firm unilaterally refusing to be sold potentially earns a duopoly profit, the acquisition cost is, for each firm, the profit earned in competition with the first firm. The behaviour of the firms asking for a duopoly profit can be seen as an hold up mechanism. The opportunity cost is the profit of the first firm if it does not buy any firm.
We note with 
We can establish the monopoly profit of the firm 1:
We can give the opportunity cost of the firm 1 (the profit realized by this firm if it buys no firm): 
Finally, the acquisition cost of an inefficient firm takes the following form:
If firms are initially present in the industry, the monopolization condition is: n
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This result is intuitive because monopoly profits are more sensitive to efficiency than profits in any other market structure. Indeed we have shown that monopolization is possible for every size of industry if the cost heterogeneity is large enough.
Note that
Subsequently, the larger the industry is, the stronger the cost heterogeneity must be to have monopolization.
In the symmetric case, that is for 1 c c = , we find, like Kamien and Zang (1990) , that industries larger than two firms cannot be monopolized.
The dynamic game:
We have shown that monopolization is feasible in large industries if the cost structure is heterogeneous enough. If the game takes place in several rounds, we see that cost structure conditions are modified. Indeed, to buy out firms become less expensive in the dynamic game because of the disappearance of the hold up mechanism previously identified. The sellers cannot ask for duopoly profits as the monopolization can appear in several rounds and not only in the next round. Consequently, if the discount factor is 1, that is without actualization rate, every industry monopolized in the static game is also monopolized in several rounds. 
With a three-firm industry:
We exclude the one round case because it is equivalent to the static monopolization case.
We assume that there are two rounds because it is easy to prove that a path with more than two rounds does not provide an advantage to the first owner 7 .
Thus, one firm is purchased in the first round and another is bought in the next round. 6 In particular, the remaining firms are informed of the previous buying. 7 To buy one firm per round is the most advantageous path to reach monopolization (see Kamien and Zang (1993) ). Again, we must analyze conditions of these two acquisitions. Hence a backward induction arguing is followed, that is:
Second round:
After the second stage, if the dominant firm monopolized the industry, it earns an infinite monopoly profit flow.
To obtain this payoff, it must pay the acquisition cost of the remaining firm. As this last firm could earn a duopoly profit by deviating from its own sell off, the firm 1 will have to pay this duopoly profit to monopolize the industry.
The dominant firm could earn an infinite flow of duopoly profits by paying no firm. Therefore, when this last one monopolizes the industry, its opportunity cost is this infinite flow of duopoly profit (proof in appendix A): 
First round:
At the first stage, in order to monopolize the industry in the following stage, the firm 1 has to buy one firm. To buy the other one, it has to pay an infinite and discounted flow of triopoly profit. As the game is dynamic, the dominant firm can spread his takeovers over several rounds. Consequently, the hold up mechanism of the static game disappears. Moreover, when the firm 1 buys a firm, it gives up his infinite and discounted flow of triopoly profit. It is his opportunity cost. Nevertheless, it will earn a duopoly profit instead (proof in 
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[ ] Therefore, we find again the result of Kamien and Zang (1993).
With a four-firm industry:
In this industry configuration, there are several monopolization paths, but we can prove that monopolization is easier with three rounds.
Thus, we study this path. Let us solve by the same way:
The conditions of the third and second stage are respectively the same than 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 Third round: the first owner buys the last firm: 
Second round: the first owner buys another firm: At the first stage, in order to monopolize the industry in the following stage, the first firm has to buy one firm. To buy the other, it has to pay an infinite and discounted profit flow of a single firm in a four-firm industry.
Indeed, the hold up mechanism of the static game does not exist. Moreover, by purchasing a firm, the firm 1 gives up his infinite and discounted profit flow of single firm in a four-firm industry. Nevertheless, it will earn a triopoly profit instead (proof in the appendix C): 
Conclusion:
In this paper, we have shown that firms' heterogeneity increases the incentives to merge. Since the best method to value these incentives is to make endogenous merger decisions, we have built a model in which owners' decisions are taken into account.
To simplify the analysis, we focused on the extreme case where merger leads to monopolization.
Our results differ from Zang (1990 and 1993) . Indeed, these authors showed that large industries cannot be monopolized. Introducing a large enough cost heterogeneity, we have shown that monopolization is feasible for all industry sizes. Moreover, monopolization is easier if the game is a dynamic one and especially if the discount factor is high. To reach this conclusion, we provided two illustrations, for three and four firm-industry because in dynamic, the n-firm generalization is too complex. This result supports the "takeover waves" explanation of Fauli-Oller (2000) based on cost asymmetries.
Moreover, the following intuition explains it: the monopoly profit is more sensitive to a fall in production cost than oligopoly profit.
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